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Company, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal corporation; 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF 
SALT LAKE •CITY, a body politic; the PUB-
LIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, a 
Commission of Utah; ALEXANDER BUILDING 
CORPORATION OF UTAH, a corporation; 
SHAW INC., a corporation; SOUTHEAST INC., 
a corporation; S.ALT LAKE COUNTY CON-
SERVANCY DISTRICT, a body politic; BER-
THA SHEPHERD; BERNARD P. BROCK-
BANK, doing business as the Brockbank Realty 
and Construction Company; GEORGE H. 
SMEATH, MARY H. SMEATH and J. K. 
THAYN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., a corpora-
tion, ALMA H. COTTAM, MEEKS WIRTHLIN· 
and ADRIAN WRIGHT, a partnership, doing 
business as Wright-Wirthlin Company, JOHN 0. 
SPECK, McDONALD BROS., INC., a corpora-
tion; JOSEPH McDONALD; and KEITH L. 
KNIGHT, doing business as Knight Realty 
Company, Plaintiffs and App·ellants, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal corporation; 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF 
SALT LAKE ·CITY, a body politic; the PUB-
LIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, a 
Commission of Utah; ALEXANDER BUILDING 
CORPORATION OF UTAH, a corporation; 
SHAW INC., a corporation; SOUTHEAST INC., 
a corporation; SALT LAKE COUNTY CON-
SERVANCY DISTRICT, a body politic; BER-
THA SHEPHERD; BERNARD P. BROCK-
BANK, doing business as the Brockbank Realty 
and Construction Company; GEORGE H. 
SMEATH, MARY H. SMEATH and J. K. 
THAYN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8206 
BRIEF' OF PLAINTIF·FS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is. a proceeding brought under the D·ecla.ratory 
Judgment Act, Title 78, Chapter 33, Utah ·Code Anno-
·tated, 1953. 
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2 
To tlie p·etition for a D·eclaratory Judgment filed by 
the plaintiff a numher of defendants filed Motions to 
Dismiss the petition which Motions were granted and 
the Petition dismissed. (R. 1-15) 
The plaintiffs prosecute this appeal from the judg-
ment dismissing the petition. _The provisions of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act which authorized the prosecu-
tion of this proceeding provide: 
"78-33-1. The district courts within their re-
spective jurisdictions shall have power to declare 
rights, status and other legal relations, whether or 
not further relief is or could be claimed. No ac-
tion or proceeding shall be open to objection on the 
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is 
prayed for. The declaration may be either af-
firmative or negative in form and effect; and such 
declaration shall h·ave the force and effect of a 
final judgment or decree. 
"78-33-2. Any person ... whose rights, stat-
us or other legal relations are affected by a stat-
ute, municipal ordinance contract or franchise, 
' ' . may have determined any question of construction 
or validity arising under the ... statute, ordi-
nance, contract or franchise and obtain a declara-
tion of rights, status or other legal relations there-
under. 
"78-33-5. The enumeration in sections 78-
33-2 . . . does not limit or restrict the -exercise 
of the general powers conferred in Section 78-33-1 
in any proceeding 'vhere declaratory relief is 
sough't, in which a judgment or decree will termi-
nate the controversy or remove an uncertainty. 
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3 
"78-33-11. When declaratory relief is sought 
all persons shall be made p·arties who have or 
·claim any interest which would he affected by 
the declaration, and no declaration shall preju-
dice the rights of persons not parties to the p·ro-
ceeding. In any proceeding which involves the 
validity of a municipal or county ordinance or 
franchise such municipality or county shall be 
made a party, and shall be entitled to he· heard, 
and if a statute or state franchise or permit is al-
leged to be invalid the attorney general shall be 
served with a copy of the proceeding and be en-
titled to be heard. 
"78-33-12. This chapter is declared to be 
remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford 
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with re-
spect to rights, status and other legal relations ; 
and is to be liberally construed and administered." 
The Petition filed by the plaintiffs herein in sub-
stance alleges : 
That the plaintiff, County Water System is a corpo-
ration, duly organized and existing under the laws of the 
State of Utah and as such on F·eb. 26, 1951 had issued to 
it a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity whereby it 
is authorized to furnish and it is now engaged in fur-
nishing culinary water to the inha.bi tan ts of an area par-
ticularly described in the petition, which area is vvith-
out the boundaries of defendant, Salt Lake City, and 
within Salt Lake County; that the plaintiff, County 
Water System has a water supply which is ample to pro-
vide for the needs of the area which it is authorized to 
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serve, and it has expended in excess of $150,000.00 in the 
construction of a system to furnish the inhabitants within 
such area with culinary water. It is further alleged in 
the petition that the plaintiff, Alma H. Cottam, is a 
property owner and tax payer in Salt Lake City, and 
that the other plaintiffs are the owners or have an in-
terest in the lands mentioned in paragraph one of the 
petition; that the defendants are what they are desig-
nated as being in the title of this proceeding. The follow-
ing further allegations are quot·ed from the p·etition: 
12. That plaintiffs are informed and believe and 
upon such information and belief allege the facts to be 
that the parties to this action, plaintiffs and defendants, 
all have or claim to have an interest and they are the only 
parties. who do have an interest in the subject matter of 
this ·action. 
13. That it 1s provided by U.C.A., 1953 10-8-14 
that: 
"They (cities) may construct, maintain and 
operate waterworks, gas works, electric light 
works, telephone lines or street railways, or au-
thorize the construction, maintenance and opera-
tion of the same by oth.ers, or purchase or lease 
such works from any person or corporation, and 
they may sell and deliver the surplus product or 
service of any such works, not required by the city 
or its inhabitants, to others beyond the· limits. of 
the city." 
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14. That the defendant Public Service Commission 
of Utah is by U.C.A., 1953 54-4-1 vested with power and 
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility 
in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every 
such public utility in this state, and to ao all things, 
whether herein specifically designated or in addition 
thereto which are necessary or convenient in the exercise 
of such powers and juri~sdiction. 
15. Among the public utilities provided for by the 
La,vs of Utah is a water corporation which is defined 
in U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1 subsection 26, as including every 
corporation and person, their lessees, trustees and re-
ceivers or trustees appointed by any court whatsoever, 
owning, controiling, operating or managing any water 
system for public service within this state; provided this 
shall not apply to a private irrigation company engaged 
in distributing water only to their stockholders. 
16. U.C.A., 1953 54-2-1, subsection 28, among other 
rna tters provides : 
"The term 'public utility' includes every ... 
water corporation . . . which performs a service 
for or delivers a eommodity to the public for 
which any compensation or payment whatsoever 
is received, such ... water corporation is hereby 
declared to be a public utility, subject to the juris-
diction and regulation of the commis~ion and to 
the provisions of this title. Except, as hereinafter 
provided, when any person or corporation per-
forms any such service for or delivers any such 
commodity to any public utility herein defined, 
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~uch p·erson or corporation, and each thereof, 
1s h~re by declared to be a public utility, and to be 
subJect to the jurisdiction and regulation of the 
commission and to the provisions of this title. 
Any corporation or person not engaged in busi-
ness exclusively as a public utility a.s hereinbefore 
defined shall be _governed by the provisions of this 
title in respect only to the public utility or public 
utilities owned, controlled, operated or managed 
hy it or by him, and not in respect to any other 
business or pursuit. 
"Provided, that whenever any p-erson, associ-
ation, company or corporation, not engaged in 
business as a p·ublic utility as defined by this act 
shall be able to produce a surplus of electric 
energy or power, gas or water, beyond the needs 
of its own business and shall desire to sell, ex-
change, deliver or otherwise dispose of such sur-
plus to or "\vith any public utility as in this act 
defined, such public utility desiring to effect a 
p·urchase or exchange of such surpJus shall sub1nit 
to the commission, for authorization by said com-
mission, a p·roposed contract covering~ such pur-
chase or exchange. The commission shall there-
upon determine, after a public hearing, whether, 
in the public interest, it sh.all be advisable that 
such contract be executed and, if not adverse to 
the p·ublic interest, said commission shall author-
ize the execution of said contract, and thereupon 
such public utility shall have the right to pur-
chase and receive or exchange such surplus prod-
uct in accordance with the terms of such contract. 
Such person, company, corporation or association 
selling or exchanging such surplus product under 
such authorized contract shall not thereby becon1e 
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a public utility within the meaning of this act, 
nor shall it be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
commission." 
17. That the provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 10-8-14 
above quoted is uncertain, and in light of the claimed 
authority of defendant Salt Lake City as hereinafter 
alleged, needs construction as to what may lawfully be 
done by defendant city by way of the delivery of water 
not needed by the city beyond the limits, of the city. 
18. That the provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 54-2-1, 
subsection 28 above quoted is uncertain and in light of the 
claimed authority of defendant Salt Lake City, as herein-
after alleged, needs construction as to what may lawfully 
be done by defendant city with respect to the construction, 
regulation and control of water and water systems be-
yond the limits of the city and as to whether or not a city 
may be regulated by the defendant, Public Service Com-
mission of Utah. 
19. That notwithstanding the provisions of the stat-
utory la\v above mentioned the defendant, Salt Lake City, 
claims the following rights and is exercising or threaten-
ing to exercise the following functions: 
(a) That the defendant, Salt Lake City, may do as 
it desires in the n1atter of selling and delivering its 
surplus water outside of its limits without being in any 
way subject to the jurisdiction of the defendant, Public 
Service Con1mission of Utah. 
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(b) That the defendant, Salt Lake City, may law-
fully enter into contracts to furnish water within the 
area described in p~aragraph 1 of this Petition without 
permission so to do by the defendant, Public Service 
Commission of Utah, and that by so doing neither of the 
plaintiffs have any legal cause to complain. 
(c) That by the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-14, 
the defendant city is granted authority to make a con-
tract with anyone who will build a pipeline for the pur-
pose of delivering culinary water to the inhabi~ants 
within the area described in paragraph 1 of this com-
plaint and provides in such contract that the defendant 
city will make a payment or refund to the one construct-
ing such a pipe line in the sum of $150.00 for each service 
connection made with the pip·e line so constructed. 
(d) That if and when a pipe line for the delivery 
of culinary water is constructed within the area described 
in paragraph 1 of this co1nplaint, the defendant city has 
authority to take over the complete operation and control 
of such pipe line, deliver water through such pipe line 
to all who have connections thereto, fix the amount of 
charges for each connection, collect such charges and 
exercise dominion over such pipe line the san1e as it could 
do if it \vere the absolute owner thereof. 
(e) That the defen·dant city has the authority to p~re­
pare and carry out an over-all plan to furnish culinary 
water to all of the area described in paragraph 1 of this 
corn plaint. 
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(f) That the defendant city has authority to supply 
culinary water to any or all of the inhabitants within the 
area described in paragraph 1 of the complaint without 
regard to whether or not the plaintiff, County Water Sys-
tem, Inc., is injured thereby. 
The plaintiffs contend that the proVIsions of the 
laws of Utah and particularly U.C.A., 1953, 54-4-1 and 
U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, subsection 28, when properly con-
strued gives to the defendant, Public Service Commis-
sion of lTtah, jurisdiction over the defendant city with 
respect to all culinary \vater sold and delivered outside 
of such defendant city, that is to say, the defendant city 
may sell and deliver water only to a public utility as pro-
vided in lT.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, subsection 28, or to some-
one for his own use and benefit, and that the defendant 
City is without auth.ority to control or operate a water 
system outside of the City. So also is it the contention 
of the plaintiffs that the defendant City is without au-
thority to directly or indirectly expend any of its funds 
for the construction, repair or operation of pipel~es 
or other facilities which are for the purpose of carrying 
water from the water system constructed for supplying 
the City and its inhabitants with culinary water to the 
consumer of water who resides outside of the city. 
20. That if the defendant City is permitted to cause 
to be constructed a culinary system within the area de-
scribed in paragraph one of this petition and supply the 
inhabitants within said area with culinary water, the 
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10 
plaintiff, County W'ater System, Inc., will suffer irrep-
arable injury and some of the money which plaintiff, 
Alma H. Cottam, pays in taxes or otherwise will un-
lawfully be expended by defendant City in paying for 
the construction, repair or operation of a water system 
outside of the corporate limits of defendant City. 
21. That a construction by this Court of the extent 
of the authority, extent and limitation of the right of 
the defendant City to sell and deliver water, to e·xpend 
money of the defendant City, and to operate and control 
\Vater systems outside of the City, will remove the uncer-
tainty hereinbefore alleged and settle the controversy be-
tween the parties to this proceeding. 
WHEREF·ORE, plaintiffs pray judgment: 
I. That the court construe the provisions of U.C.A. 
19·53, 10-8-4 and U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, subsection 28, to the 
end that the defendant, Salt Lake City, is without au-
thority to sell or deliver any water within the area de-
scribed in pHragraph 1 of this petition, except as to the 
plaintiff, County Water System, Inc. 
II. That the defendant City is without authority to 
operate a water system for the delivery of \Vater outside 
of its limits. 
III. That the~ defendant City be enjoined from con-
structing or aiding in the construction or repair of a 
water systen1 for the distribution of culinary water to in-
habitants outside of its limits. 
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IV. That the defendant City be enjoined from en-
gaging in the control and operation of a water system 
outside of its limits. 
V. That such other and further judgment and de-
cree be entered in this cause as may appear to the court 
proper and that plaintiffs be awarded their costs. 
As heretofore stated in this brief, a number of the 
defendants filed motions to dismiss the above mentioned 
petition filed herein upon the ground that the petition 
fails to state a claim against the defendants upon which 
relief can be granted and that said motions were granted 
and the petition dismissed. Plaintiffs refused to fur-
ther plead and prosecute this appeal from the judgment 
of dismissal. 
The points and errors upon which plaintiffs rely for 
a reversal of the judgment appealed from are as follows: 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
PETITION HEREIN. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CON-
STRUE THE PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, 
SUBDIVISIONS 3, 26 AND 28, TO THE EFFECT 
TI-IAT THE DEFENDANT, SALT LAKE CITY, IS 
WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO SELL OR DELIVER ANY 
WATER WITHIN THE AREA DESCRIBED IN PARA-
GRAPH 1 OF THE PETITION FILED HEREIN EX-
CEPT WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DEFENDANT 
COMMISSION AND ONLY TO THE PLAINTIFF, 
COU:t--ITY WATER SYSTEM, IN~C., OR OTHER PUBLIC 
UTILITY. 
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POINT THREE 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY 
IS WITHOUT RIGHT OR AUTHORITY TO CON-
STRUCT OR OPERATE A WATER SYSTEM FOR THE 
DELIVERY OF WATER TO RETAIL CONSUMERS 
OUTSIDE OF ITS CORPORATE LIMITS OR TO REG-
ULATE OR CONTROL THE DISTRIBUTION OF WA-
TER THROUGH SUCH SYSTEM. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE DEFENDANT PUBLIC SERVICE ·COM-
MISSION OF UTAH HAS AUTHORITY AND THAT IT 
IS ITS DUTY TO REGULATE THE SALE AND DIS-
TRIBUTION OF WATER WHICH IS DISPOSED OF 
BY THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY OUTSIDE 
OF ITS CORPORATE LIMITS. 
ARGUMENT 
It will be noted that in the petition filed herein we 
have joined as plaintiff a property owner and a tax payer 
of Salt Lake City, Utah. The purpose of doing so was 
to bring to the attention of the court the fact that the 
tax payers of Salt Lake City as well as the County Water 
System has a vital interest in the question of whether 
or not the City may engage in the business of owning, 
constructing or operating a culinary water system beyond 
its corporate limits and to use the money of its tax payers 
in such a venture. So also have we jointed as defend-
ants a number of individual partnerships and corpora-
tions who are th·e owners of land within or adjoining 
the area where the plaintiff corporation is engaged in 
operating its water system. In so joining such land o\vn-
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ers, it was and is plaintiff's view that the statute requir-
ing all interested persons to be made parties to a peti-
tion for a declaratory judgment makes it necessary to 
join such land owners as parties to this proceeding. So 
also does it seem that plaintiff is, by the statute, re-
quired to make the Metropolitan Water District of Salt 
Lake City a party to this proceeding. Indeed the inter-
ests of such water district is so intimately interwoven 
with the interest of Salt Lake City that any decree tha.t 
may be entered curtailing the powers of Salt Lake City 
is certain to affect the Metropolitan Water District of 
Salt Lake City. 
The defendant, Salt Lake County Conservancy Dis-
trict, includes territory of Salt Lake County outside of 
the cities. Its powers and duties are defined in Chapter 
9, Title 73, U.C.A. 1953. It may well have an intere'St 
in the subject matter of this litigation and therefor it 
vvas made a party defendant. 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
PETITION HEREIN. 
This Court has had occa;sion to apply and construe 
the Declaratory Judgment Act on a number of occa-
sions, among which are Gray v. Defa, 103 U. 339; 135 
Pac. ( 2d) 251; 253, Reed v. Anderson, 211 Pac. ( 2d) 206. 
It will be seen from the foregoing cases that vvhile 
the Act 'does not contain any provisions as to the pro._ 
ce·dure to be followed, this Court has indicated that the 
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procedure -should he similar to that in civil cases gener-
ally and that the Act may be resorted to even though 
some other form of action may be available. 
At the outset of this proceeding, it may be well to 
dispose of the case as it may affect the rights of the 
parties against which no affirmative relief is sought. It 
will be seen that the Act 78-33-11 requires that all per-
sons who have or claim any interest which would be af-
fected by the declaration are to he made parties and that 
the rights of persons not parties are not prejudiced by 
the judgment or decree entered. Also by 78-33-1 the 
Court shall entertain jurisdiction if the relief sought is 
merely to declare rights, status or other legal relations. 
It was urged at the oral argument in the lower court 
on behalf of the defendant, 1\tfetropolitan Water District 
of Salt Lake City, that because plaintiff is not seeking 
relief directly against it that therefore, the action should 
be dismissed as to it. The language of the Act is not 
subject to any such narrow construction. If the Metro-
politan Water District of Salt Lake City has any rights 
or interest which would be affected by the declaratory 
judgment prayed, it is by the Act required to be made a 
party. The law creating and defining the powers of 
Metropolitan Water District vvill be found in U.C.A. 1953, 
Ttle 73, Chapter 8. 
It will be seen from the Act creating the Metropoli-
tan Water Districts that the sa1ne are to be so created 
at the instance of the "legislative body of any 1nunici-
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pality". U.C.A. 1953, 73-8-4 and 73-8-9. So also does the 
Act provide that "in the sale, leasing and delivery of 
water as hereinbefore provided, preference shall always 
be given to the water requirements within the district," 
and that "Each city, the area of which shall be a p·art or 
all of any district incorporated hereunder, shall have a 
preference right to purchase from the district for distri-
bution by such city, or any public utilty therein empow-
ered by said city for the purpose, for ~domestic, municipal 
and other beneficial uses within such city, etc." U.C.A. 
1953, 73-8-18, subdivision (e), page 657. The Act fur-
ther provides in U.C.A. 1953, 73-8-19, that "If any dis-
trict shall include the area of only one municipality, then 
the regularly appointed aitorney and the regularly ap-
pointed engineer of such municipality shall be, ex officio, 
the attorney and engineer, respectively, of such district", 
and 73-8-20 provides that "If any district shall include the 
area of only one municipality, then the Board of Directors 
shall consist of such number as the governing body of 
that municipality shall determine." If these and other 
provisions of the Act do not make the defendant, Metro-
politan Water District, interested in the kind of a de-
claratory judgment that shall be rendered against the 
defendant City, then indeed is it difficult to conceive of a 
state of facts or of the law that would constitute such an 
interest as that which requires one bringing an action un-
der the declaratory judgment Act to bring in the parties 
"who have or claim any interest which would be affected 
by the declaration." U.C.A. 1953, 78-33-11. It may be 
inquired, is not the defendant, Metropolitan Water Dis-
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trict, interested in the question of whether or not Salt 
Lake City may put in and operate a culinary water system 
to supply the needs of all the people in Salt Lake County 
or elsewhere~ It would seem to us that it is of vital con-
cern to the District to know what area in Utah may be 
served by Salt Lake City with culinary water and whether 
or not the City is subject to the control of the defendant 
Commission over water sold and delivered outside of the 
limits of the city. These matters cannot help but affect 
th·e am:ount of water that the city will purchase from the 
District. 
But suppose we are wrong in our contention that the 
defendant, Metropolitan Water District, is without any 
interest in the kind of declaratory judgment that may be 
rendered against the defendant City, it has a simple way 
of getting out of this litigation by disclaiming any inter-
est in the subject matter of this litigation. Plaintiffs 
have alleged that they have or claim to have such an 
interest. If the defendant District admits that it has 
an interest and sets out the nature of such interest, then 
there may be an issue to be tried. If it disclaims any in-
terest in the subject matter of this action, then, of course, 
there will be nothing to try, and the plaintiffs may take 
their judgment and the District will be bound by the 
judginent entered. Such we believe to be the clear im-
plication of the Declaratory Judgment Act. The relief 
provided for by the Act is that a party may have deter-
mined and quieted his rights even though no other relief 
is sought. The relief therein provided for is quite sim-
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ilar to the relief sought in the usual suit to quiet title. 
The difference bering that in the Declaratory Judgment 
Act it is rights of various kinds that may be quieted and 
not merely rights to tangible property. This Court has 
in effect so held in the case of Gray v. D·efa, 103 U. 339, 
135 Pac. (2d) 251, 253, supra. 
It is, of course, the approved practice in a suit to 
quiet title to allege that a defendant claims some righ-t, 
title or interest in the property involved in the action ad-
verse to the rights of the plaintiff. Unless plaintiff is 
advised of the specific cTaim made by a defendant, that i's 
all that plaintiff is able to allege. The defendant knows 
or should know what, if any, claim is made to property 
in an action to quiet title. So in this case the defendants 
know or should know what interest they claim in the· sub-
ject matter of the action that may be affected by the 
judgment or decree which plaintiff seeks. To illustrate, 
it may be that some of the defendants have a contract 
with the defendant City as to the construction and oper-
ation of a water system outside of the city. If so, the 
interest of such party would be affected by the granting 
of the relief 'vhich plaintiffs seek. As heretofore stated, 
if any defendant has no interest in the subject matter of 
this litigation, it is a simple Ina.tter for such defendant 
to make a disclaimer, in which event the Court can enter 
the appropriate decree, which, of course, will be binding 
on the disclaiming defendant. The plaintiffs have no de-
sire to, and if they did have such a desire, they could not 
force any defendant to litigate a matter in which such 
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defendant makes a disclaimer, but the plaintiffs do have 
a right to a determination of the questions posed by their 
p·etition and when the same are determined to have such 
' determination become binding on the parties to the action. 
By the dismissal of the action without more it is to say 
' . ' 
the least, very doubtful if such dismissal is equivalent to 
an adjudication that the dismissed defendant is without 
any interest in the subject matter of the action. Gener-
ally speaking, a judgment to be binding must he upon 
the merits. If a 'defendant disclaims any interest in the 
subject matter of the action, and in conformity therewith 
the Court fin·ds that the defendant so disclaiming is with-
out interest in the subject matter of the action, such de-
claration woul'd set the matter at rest and plaintiffrs could, 
not thereafter be called upon to re-litigate the m·atters 
dispose'd of in some future action such as is prOivided for 
by U. C.A. 19·53, 78-33-8. 
In the main, what we have said about the dismissal 
of the action as to the 1\fetropolitan Water District ap-
plies to the other defendants, except as to the defendants 
City and C·ommission. That is to say, if a defendant 
against whom no relief is sought disclaims all interest in 
the subject matter of the litigation, that should be an 
end to the~ controversy with the defendant so disclaiming. 
An entirely different situation is presented with re-
spect to the defendant Commission and defendant City. 
As to the Commission, it cannot well disclaim all inter-
est in the subject matter of the litigation. If we are right 
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in our contention the law fastens an interest upon the 
defendant Commission in this litigation which it cannot 
escape by a disclaimer. If we are wrong in our conten-
tion, the defendant Commission is doubtless interested in 
being advised of such fact so that it may act accordingly. 
Obviously the defendant City has an interest in the sub-
ject matter of this litigation because plaintiffs are seek-
ing affirmative relief against the defendant City. 
POINT TW·O 
THE 'TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CON .. 
STRUE THE PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, 
SUBDIVISIONS 3, 26 AND 28, TO THE EFFECT 
THAT THE DEFENDANT, SALT LAKE CITY, IS 
WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO SELL OR DELIVER ANY 
WATER WITHIN THE AREA DESCRIBED IN PARA .. 
GRAPH 1 OF THE PETITION FILED HEREIN EX-
CEPT WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DEFENDANT 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, AND ONLY TO 
THE PLAINTIFF, COUNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., 
OR OTHER PUBLIC UTILITY AS DEFINED BY 
U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1 SUBDIVISION 28, THEREOF. 
It will be seen that by U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, subdi-
vision 3 cities are expressly placed in the same class as 
other corporations and by subdivision 26, corporations 
owning, controlling, operating or managing any water 
system for public service is a water corporation. By 
subsection 28, a water corporation is a public utility and 
as such subjeet to the jurisdiction of the defendant, Pub-
lic Service Commission. If, however, a corporation is 
not engaged exclusively as a public utility, it shall be 
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governed by the public utility act only with respect to its 
activities as a public utility, ·or it may dispose of its 
surplus water to a public utility. Such is, we submit, 
the expressed provisions of tlie Act above referred to. 
If the defendant City may lawfully do as it chooses with 
respect to the manner in which it shall dispose of its 
surplus water outside of its boundaries, then indeed does 
the whole fabric of our Public Utility Law become mean-
ingless whenever a city chooses to make it so. 
Thus, if the defendant City has the authority to do 
what it claims the right to do, it may go into the area 
which plaintiff is authorized to serve and there construct 
a competing water system, charge rates so low as to 
drive plaintiff out of business and, having once accom-
plished that end, increase the rates to su0h an extent as 
to be reimbursed not only for any loss that may have 
accrued by reason of the cheap rates, but also secure a 
handson1e profit from the water sold after the plaintiff 
has been driven out of business. 
There was a time before the advent of the Public 
Utility laws that such practice was legal and a common 
practice by large corporations as a means of driving 
small corporations out of business. One of the main pur-
poses of the Public Utility Law is to condemn that prac-
tice. 
It was argued in the Court below that Salt Lake 
City is supreme and beyond the control of the defendant 
' Commission. As to water which it furnishes to the city 
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and its inhabitants, it would seem that the doctrine of the 
case of Loga.n City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 U. 
536; 271 Pac. 961, leads to that result. Not so, however, 
with respect to water which is supplied to areas beyond 
the city. A city has a right to furnish water or electri-
cal energy outside of its boundaries by reason of the 
grant of such authority by the Legislature and not other-
wise, such is the holding of the authorities generally. 37 
Am. Jur. S.ec. 122, page 726 and 38 Am. Jur. Sec. 570, 
page 258, and cases cited in footnotes. 
If, as the authorities teach, a city may dispose of its 
surplus water beyond its limits when and only when au-
thorization to do so is granted by constitutional or legis-
lative authority, it necessarily follows that the authority 
granting the City such power may limit the condition 
under which the same may be exercised. That is to say, 
the defendant, Salt Lake City, must look to U.C.A. 1953, 
10-8-14, wherein it is provided that they (cities) may sell 
and deliver the surplus product or service of any such 
works not required by the city or its inhabitants to oth-
ers beyond the limits of the city for its authority to dis-
pose of its surplus water outside of the city. The Legis-
lature, having as it does the power to grant or with-
hold the right of a city to dispose of its surplus water 
outside of its boundaries, it necessarily follows that the 
Legislature may fix the conditions under which the city 
may dispose of its surplus water outside of its limits. 
It will be seen that by the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 
54-2-1, subdivision 3, cities are placed in the same class 
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as other corporations. Tha.t being so, they are subject 
to the same treatment as are other corporations, so far 
as that is possible, especially where, as in U.C.A. 1953, 
54-2-1, subdivision 28, it is so provided. 
T·he Legislature having placed cities in the same -class 
as other corporations, it must have intended that de-
fendant City and plaintiff corporation should both comply 
with the Public Utility Law and submit to the jurisdiction 
and regulation of the defendant Commission. Much of 
our argument applicable to Point Two is also applicable 
to th·e matters which we wish to raise under Point Three. 
It may be necessary to repeat some of our argument un-
der Point Three, but we shall attempt to hold repetition 
at a minimum. 
POINT THREE 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY 
IS WITHOUT RIGHT OR AUTHORITY TO CON-
STRUCT OR OPERATE A WATER SYSTEM FOR THE 
DELIVERY OF WATER TO R.ETAIL CONSUMERS 
OUTSIDE OF ITS CORPORATE LIMITS OR TO REG-
ULATE OR CONTROL THE DISTRIBUTION OF WA-
TER THROUGH SUCH SYSTEM. 
It is the contention of the plaintiffs: 
First: That while the defendant City may sell its 
surplus water outside of its boundaries, it is without 
authority to construct or operate a distributing system 
for the distribution of water to retail consumers outside 
of its boundaries. 
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Second: If it shall be concluded that the defendant 
City has authority to construct and operate a distribut-
ing system outside of its limits, it may not do so with-
out being subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of 
the defendant, Public Service Commission of-Utah. 
As to the first point, the law is well settled in this 
and other jurisdictions that cities have such power and 
only such powers as are expressly granted, and those 
necessarily or fairly implied or incident to the powers 
expressly granted, and those essential to the accomplish-
ment of the declared objects and purposes of the corpora-
tions not simply convenient but indispensable. Dillon 
Municipal corporations, 5th Ed. Sec. 237. Am,ericwn 
Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 Pac. 249; Salt 
Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah, 533; 216 Pac. 234. Rapid 
Trawsit Co. v. Ogden City 89, Utah 546, 58 Pac. (2d) 1; 
Am.erica,n Petroleum Co. et al. v. Ogd'en City et al., 90 
Utah 465; 62 Pac. (2·d) 557; Salt Lake City v. Revine, 101 
Utah 504; 124 Pac. (2d) 537. 
It is also the settled law that municipal corporations 
are generally confined in their operations to their own 
corporate limits, and only when given special legislative 
po-vver expressly or necessarily implied can they act extra-
territorily. 37 Am. J ur. Sec. 122, page 736; 38 Am. J ur. 
Sec. 570, page 258, and cases cited in footnotes to the 
text. Moreover, when authority is given to a municipal-
ity to act beyond its limits, it is held to the same require .. 
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ments as a private corporation engaged in the same busi-
ness. The operation of a water system is a proprietary, 
not a governmental function. Egelhoff v. Ogden City, 71 
Utah 511; 267 Pac. 1011. 
The statutory law of Utah granting cities the au-
thority to sell and deliver water not required by the city 
or its inhabitants which plaintiff seeks to have construed 
is U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-14. 
So that the Court may have readily available such 
provision, we again quote the same : 
"They (cities) may construct, maintain and 
operate waterworks . . . . or authorize the con-
struction, maintenance and operation of the same 
by others., or purchase or lease such works from 
any person or corporation and they may sell and 
deliver the surplus p-roduct or service of any such 
works not required by the city or its. inhabitants to 
others beyond the limits of the city." 
During the course of the oral argument in the Court 
below, counsel for defendant City directed the attention 
of the Court to a number of other statutory provisions, 
among which are: U.C.A. 1953, 10-7-5, 10-7-10, 10-7-11, 
10-7-14 and 10-8-2. 
It will be seen that the p·rovisions of the law above 
referred to by defendant City do not deal with water that 
may be disposed of because not needed by the city, ex-
cept possibly the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-2. More-
over, if the defendant City "may do all things in relation 
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thereto (dispose of its surplus water) as natural per-
sons" and no more, then and in such case the City is sub-
ject to the regulation of the defendant Commission. It 
is one of the cardinal principles of law applied in the con-
struction of a statute that expressio wnius est exclusio 
alterius. So the defendant City, having been .given the 
same power to deal with its property as that possessed 
by an individual, is excluded from the exercise of any 
greater power. Obviously an individual owning a water 
right could not lawfully do what the petitio11 alleges the 
defendant City is doing and planning to do without hav-
ing received from the commission a Certificate of Con-
venience and Necessity. 
To revert to U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-t±, it will be seen t~at 
the city is e1npowered to sell and deliver the surplus prod-
uct or service of any such works not required by the city 
or its inhabitants to others beyond the limits of the city. 
Applying the rule that a city has only such powers 
as are expressly conferred upon it, as stated in the fore-
going cases, there is nothing in the Act which authorizes 
the city to do a number of things concerning which plain-
tiffs complain in their petition. To illustrate, it would 
be an extension of the language of the Act beyond the 
breaking point to say that the fact that the city may sell 
and deliver its surplus water, it necessarily follows that 
it may "purchase retail water companies in the unincor-
porated area of Salt Lake County and assume to own, 
operate and manage the same." "To take over the com-
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plete operation and control of .... pipe lines, deliver 
water through such pipe lines . . .. fix the amount of 
charges for each connection, collect such charges and ex-
ercise dominion over such pip·e lines the ~same as it could 
do if it were the absolute owner thereof." "To prepare and 
carry out an over-all plan to furnish culinary water to 
all of the inhabitants of the area in which plaintiff County 
Water System has a Certificate of Convenience and Ne-
cessity." "To arbitrarily do as it desires in the 1natter 
of selling and delivering its surplus water and water 
which is not surplus which it purchased from the Metro-
politan Water District of Salt Lake City and elsewhere 
and sell and deliver the same outside of its limits at 
rates and under conditions which it may establish from 
time to time without being in any vvay subject to the 
jurisdiction of the defendant Public Service Commis-
sion." 
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the city is 
limited by the laws of the state of Utah above mentioned 
to merely sell and deliver its surplus water and that it 
may not engage in the business of constructing a water 
system outside of its limits and after having done so 
regulate such vvater system without any limitation, the 
same as it can the water system within the city. If the 
Legislature had intended to confer upon the city such 
broad powers, it would have so provided. 
While in our vievv the clear expressed lan_guage of 
the Utility Act of Utah, namely Title 54, Chapter Tvvo 
and Sections 1, subdivisions 3, 26 and 28 thereof ,vill 
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admit of no construction other than that the defendant 
City may not dispose of its surplus water except with 
the approval and under the direction of the Public s.erv-
ice Commission, we shall direct the attention of the Court 
to a number of the leading cases in this and other juris-
dictions where the question has been before the Commis-
sions and Courts. In doing so \Ve shall cite and com-
n1ent on those cases which the defendant City, in the 
Court below, clai1ned support its contention as well as 
those which support the position of the plaintiffs. 
Counsel for the defendant City in the Court below 
cited, and apparently derived some comfort from, the 
decision of this Court in the case of Mui,r v. Mu,rr:ay City, 
decided Dec. 9, 1919, 55 Utah 368; 186 Pac. 433. It will 
be seen from the opinion in that case that the contract 
upon which the action was brought was entered into on 
:Jfarch 20, 1914. The agreement provided for a loan by 
plaintiff to defendant in the sum of $1,200.00, payable 
in four annual installments evidenced by four Promis-
sory Notes, one for $369.00, payable in one year; $334.00, 
payable in two years; $336.00, payable in three years, 
and $318.00, payable in four years. The City of l\furray 
defended on the ground that the city was without power 
to contract the indebtedness because the clairned obliga-
tion gre\v out of a transaction whereby the city pur-
chased and developed an electric light plant which gen-
erated more electricity than \vas needed by the city, and 
in order to dispose of the surplus energy the city con-
structed an electric transmission line for the purpose of 
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delivering the surplus energy to "what is known as the 
town or settlement of Granite, situated a distance of 
about seven miles beyond the boundary line of Murray 
City. It is made apparent by the opinion in that case 
that the question of whether or not the defendant Com-
mission had any jurisdiction in the matter under discus-
sion was not and could not have been passed upon. The 
defendant Commission did not come into existence until 
1917, Laws of Utah 1917, Sec. 4775, et seq., while the 
contract involved was executed in 1914. The Act creat-
ing the defendant Commission was not retroactive, and 
·even if an attempt had been made to make it so, such at-
tempt would of necessity be an attempt to impair the ob-
ligation of,a contract, contrary to the p.rovisions of our 
state and federal constitution. Moreover, so far as ap-
pears from the opinion in that case, Murray City was 
not going into the business of furnishing electrical ener-
gy generally to the public. Indeed, the opinion states 
that "cities are not organized primarily for the purpose 
of engaging in commercial enterprises, however profit-
able they may appear or even prove to be." Utah Report, 
page 373. 
It is readily conceded that the defendant Commis-
sion has no power over the city in its operation of its 
water system within its boundaries. That is the effect 
of the opinion of this Court 1n the case of 
Logarn City v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, et aJ., 
72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961. While that case involved an 
electric power plant owned by the city, th.e principles of 
law there announced are doubtless applicable to water 
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systems owned by a city and used to supply its inhabi-
tants with water. The case of Logan City v. Public Util-
ities Commission supra involves a number of questions 
not here involved. Despite the length of the main 
opinion and the two opinions concurring in the results, 
it will be seen that the opinion and the concurring opin-
ions lin1it the application to the city and its. inhabitants. 
Indeed it could not have been otherwise, because the only 
facts involved in the controversy related to power served 
to the city and its inhabitants. The constitutional ques-
tion there decided had theretofore been decided by the 
Supreme Court of Colorado in the case of Holyoke v. 
81nith, 75 Colo. 286; 226 Pac. 159, and by the Supreme 
Court of Montana in the case of Public Service Com.mis-
sion v. City of Helena, 52 Mont. 527; 159 Pac. 24. The 
holding of the Colorado case was approved and the hold-
ing of the Montana case rejected. It will be noted that the 
case of Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission and 
the Colorado case supra were both ruled on the ground 
that granting to the Public Utilities Commission juris-
diction over matters relating to questions of purely local 
self-government was inhibited by constitutional provi-
sions there discussed. The question of the sa.le and de-
livery of electricity not needed by the city was not in-
volved nor discussed. To say that the doing of the acts 
by defendant City concerning which the plaintiffs com-
plain in their petition is the performance of a Inunicipal 
function obviously is not in accord with the facts. While 
as is stated in the opinion in the Logan case supra, the 
citizens of the city may correct any evil in the n1anage-
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ment of the city's plant that cannot be done by the peo-
ple outside of the city. Every argument that can be ad-
vanced in favor of the wisdom of having the defendant 
Commission control and regulate a private utility applies 
to the defendant City when it engages in the business of 
constructing and operating a system for furnishing water 
to residents outside of the city. 
In the case of Barnes et. al. v. Lehi City et al., 
74 Utah 321; 279 Pac. 878, it is he~d that a city is not 
require·d to procure a Certificate of Covenience a.nd 
Necessity from the Public Utilities Commission before 
entering into a contract to enlarge its existing electric 
power p·lant and enter into business of selling electrical 
energy to its inhabitants, and .that if the plant of the 
city is to be used to supp~ly city and its inhabitants with 
electricity, the Industrial Commission is without juris-
diction over the ·plant. That case does not aid the defend-
ants in this case. 
In the case of City of Phoenix v. Wright et a.l., 80 
Pac. (2d) 390, there was involved the construction of an 
amendn1ent to the constitution made in 1912 which pro-
vided that "all corporations other than municipal en-
gaged in .... furnishing water for irrigation or other 
public purposes shall be deemed public service corpora-
tions." In construing the provisions of the Arizona con-
stitution, it was held that such language excluded the 
Corporation Commission of Arizona from regulating the 
city of Phoenix in the service and delivery of water out-
side of its corporate limits. Obviously, if the Constitu-
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tion of Arizona excluded municipal corporations from 
being regulated by the Corporation Commission, such 
constitutional provision must prevail. 
The same question is presented and the same con-
clusion reached in the case of c·ity of Phoenix v. Kasu,m., 
97 Pac. (2d) 210. It is further held in this later Arizona 
case that the Legislature has the right to regulate rates 
charged by municipalities; that a city can dispose of only 
its surplus water outside of the city. Some other ques-
tions vvere decided in that case which bear but remotely 
if at all on the questions presented in this case. 
In the case of Water Works Boa.rd of City of Mobile 
v. City of Mobile, 43 S. (2d) 409, it is held among other 
matters that under Sec. 401, Title 37, Code 1940 of Ala-
bama, the WaterWorks Board could enter into a contract 
for the sale of water without the approval of the Alabama 
Public Service Commission. The provision of the law 
referred to expressly granted the Board such. power, 
namely to supply water not only to the inhabitants of 
the 1nunicipality, but to the "surrounding territory." 
In the case of Atlantic Canst. Co. 'l'. City of Raleigh 
(N. C.) 53, S.E. 165, there was involved the construction 
of a law vvhich expressly gave the city jurisdiction over 
its sevvage system both within and without the city. We 
can find nothing in that case vvhich throws any light on 
this case. 
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·Another North ·Carolina case, Town of Grimesland 
v. City of Washimgton, et al., 66 s .. E. (2d) 794, cited by 
counsel for defendant City, is of similar import as the 
case of Atlarntic Canst. Co. v. City of Raleigh, supra. It 
is further held in this later case that when a municipal-
ity undertakes functions beyond its governmental an4 
police powers and engages in business to render public 
service for p·rofit, it becomes amenable· by statute to reg-
ulate the same as any other corporation so engaged. 
There is, of course, no controi\Tersy in this proceed-
ing conce·rning the power of the city to sell and deliver 
water outside of its limits, because the statutes of Utah 
expressly grant such power and in the l\furray City case, 
sup·ra, our Supreme Court has so held. The question 
here presented by the plaintiff is: "What is the status 
of the defendant City, and to what limitations if 'any is 
the City subject to when it sells and delivers water out-
side of the City~" As we understand the City's position, 
it is to the effect that it may do as it pleases. The plain-
tiffs' position is that when the City goes beyond the sell-
ing and delivery of water outside of the City it becon1es 
subject to the jurisdiction of the defendant Commission 
if indeed the defendant has authority to do anything ·with 
respect to its surplus "rater other than to sell and deliver 
the same. 
In the case of Pacific Light and Power Corporation 
v. City of Pasadena, P.U.R. 1920 A 194, the California 
Railroad Co1nmission analyzed at some length the consti-
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tution and laws of the state of California and reached the 
conclusion that the Commission had jurisdiction over 
every corporation supplying electric energy for compen-
sation generally to the public, including municipalities 
rendering service outside of their corporate limits. That 
case is very instructive, not because of the Railroad Com-
mission being a tribunal of last resort, but because of the 
thorough and learned manner in which the questions 
presented are disposed of. It will be noted that the pro-
visions of the California law discussed in the opinion are 
substantially the same as the law of Utah. 
The Circuit Court of Oregon in the case of Y am,hill 
Electric Company v. City of McMinnville, etal., P.U.R,. 
192, E. 353, held that a ·city has the right to construe~ 
and operate a utility plant at points outside of the city 
but not to distribute currents in such suburban portions; 
that the city may sell current to persons beyond its limits 
but not to construct transmission or delivery facilities, 
since its power of construction for distribution stops at 
the city line, hence in the case of the city soliciting busi-
ness, constructng lines and competing with an existing 
electricity beyond its own limits, the city is on a par with 
any other electric utility and could not continue to oper-
ate in that zone without a Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity from the Public Utilities Commission, and on 
complaint of a rival utility, such further operation of 
the city was enjoined. 
That a ·statute which permits a city to opetate as a 
public utility beyond its own boundaries and compete 
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with other utilities in such territory without the formal-
ity of applying for a certificate fro~ the Public Utilities 
Commission is unconstitutional as takng pToperty with-
out due process of law. 
In Re,x Moore, et al. v. Town of Evwnsville, P.U.R. 
1952, it is held that: 
"The Commission has jurisdiction over the 
extra-territorial service of a municipal plant even 
though the plant does not have statutory author-
ity to render the same, and the fact that the serv-
ice may not be compelled by persons residing out-
side of the corporate limits as a matter of right 
does not deprive the commission of that jurisdic-
tion.'' 
The foregoing case arose in Wyoming. In the course 
of the opinion, this pertinent observation is made: 
"If a municipality can lawfully sell its surplus 
utility pToducts outside of its corporate limits 
without interference or regulation by the Com-
mission, as defendant's counsel claims it has the 
right to do, then it rnay extend \vith impunity its 
service facilities into the certificated area of a 
sirnilar utility, compete \vith the latter, duplicate 
its functions and services, pick and choose its cus-
torners and generally violate all of the \Veil-settled 
princi pies of utili t:~ regulation. These are the 
things \Vhich our utilit:T act \Yas designed to pre-
vent." 
In the course of the foregoing opinion of the Public 
Service Connnission of Wyorning, there is cited the case 
of City of Olice Ilill 'C. Publi.c Ser~·ice Comn~ission et al., 
305 l(y. 2±7, ,;~here it is held that: 
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"When the city supplied current outside of 
its corporate limits, its exemption from regulation 
as to rates and service by the Commission ceased 
and the city came within the jurisdiction of the 
Con1mission and was subject to such regulation 
by it." 
lvlulligan v. Miles City, 51 Mont. 374, 153 Pac. 276; 
Sta,r Investment Co. v. City of Denver, P.U.R·. 1920 B., 
p. 684; Re City of Laurel, P.lT.R. 1921 D., p. 817. 
~That being true, the Con1mission should have 
required the city to rnake its rates reasonable 
and its service adequate rather than to have 
granted certificates to appellees to enter the field 
in which the city was already operating." 
In the case of Town of IJ!Jilwatt(kee v. City of Jfil-
wa.1tkee, 87 P.U.R. 254 (Wis.) it is held that a mnuicipal-
ity in operating a water plant in a proprietary and not a 
governmental capacity is a public utility with the san1e 
obligations and duties and subject to the same statutes 
as apply to non-municipal utilities; that a statute which 
applies to any public utility or public utilities pertains 
to 1nunicipal as well as non-municipal utilities. In that 
case there is cited among others the case of p·abst Corp. 
v. Milwa,u}cee, 190 Wis. 349, 208 N.vV. 493; A.L.R,. 1164, 
\V here it is so held. 
It is held in Re Loveland Municipal Water Works, 
83 P.U.R. 72, that the Colorado Public Utilities Commis-
sion has jurisdiction over the extra-terri to rial operation 
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of a municip-al plant although it is without jurisdiction 
over a municipal utility operating only inside the cor-
porate limits. In support of such decision the case of 
Lamar v. Wiley, 80 ·Cal. 18; 248 Pac. 1009 is cited. In 
this case the Supreme Court of Colorado in a decision 
rendered on J'uly 6, 1926 held that when a municipality 
furnishes p·ublic service to its own citizens and in con-
nection therewith supplies its products to consumers 
outside of its territorial boundaries, it is as to such out-
side customers attended with the same conditions and 
subject to the same control and sup·ervsion that apply to 
a private public utility owner who furnishes like service. 
The Colorado court cites in support of its conclusion the 
case of Hillsboro v. Public Service Commission, 97 Ore. 
320, 187 Pac. 617, and City of South Pasadena v. Pasa-
dena Larnd & Wal.e.r Co., 152 Cal. 379, 93 Pac. 49. The 
case from Colorado above cited is of special weight here 
because of not only the principles of law therein an-
nounced, but also because this Court in the case of Logan 
City, supra, is based in great part upon the ca.se of 
Holyoke v. Sm.ith, 75 Colo. 286, 226 Pac. 158, which was 
decided in 1924. In the later Colorado case, the Supreme 
Court very clearly and forceably points out the reason 
'vhy the Public Utility Con11nission should and does have 
jurisdiction over a municipally owned facility as to prod-
uct sold or services rendered to non-residents of the mu-
nicipality, but no:t to the residents thereof. While the 
Court may be unable to read all of the cases cited, we 
urge it to reald this later Color'ado case. 
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In the Court below counsel for defendant City placed 
considerable stress on the case of City of Englewood v. 
City and County of Denver et al., 229 Pac. (2d) 667. An 
examination of that case shows that it is readily distin-
guishable from this case. At the outset it will be noted 
that the case of City of Lamar v. Town of Wiley, 80 Colo. 
18, 248 Pac. 1009, supra, was not overruled, but approved 
because the question of whether Lamar was a public 
utility furnishing electricity beyond its border was not 
an issue, while in the present case Denve-r was resisting 
the jurisdiction. We had always understood the law to 
be that jurisdiction over subject matter could not he ac-
quired by the consent of the parties to a controversy. 
The la\v in such particular is thus stated in 31 Am. Jur., 
Sec. 408, page 71 : 
"It is essential to the proper rendition of 
a judgment that the Court have jurisdiction of 
the subject matter. A judgment rendered with-
out jurisdiction of the subject matter is void. The 
operation of this rule is not affected by the ju-
dicial discretion of a Court." 
Among the great number of eases cited in a footnote 
to the text is R·e Christiansen, 17 Utah 412; 53 Pac. 1003, 
later appeal23 Utah 209; 63 Pac. 896. 
The basis for the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Colorado in the case of the City of Englewood v. City a.nd 
County of D·enver, supra, is bottorned on laws of Colo-
rado that are wholly unlike any laws in this state. We 
quote the following from the opinion in the Englewood 
case, 229 Pac. (2d) 671: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
"Chapter 163, '35 C.S.A., Sec. 22: 
"Supply water to outside consmners.-The 
incorporated to\vns and cities of the state of 
Colorado are hereby empowered to supply water 
from their water systems to consumers outside 
of the corporate limits of the said cities and 
towns; and to collect therefor such charges and 
upon such conditions and limitations as said 
towns and cities may impose by ordinance. (1. 
'11, p. 522, Sec. 1; C.L., Sec. 8999.) ." 
"Article 8, Chapter 137, '35 C.S.A., Sec. 57.-
Commission to enforce constitution and la\vs.-It 
is hereby made the duty of the commission to see 
that the provisions of the constitution and stat-
utes of this state affecting public utilities, the en-
forcement of \vhich is not specifically vested in 
some other officer or tribunal, are enforced and 
obeyed, .... " 
The opinion also quotes a provision of the la\v of 
the state of ·Colorado which provides that any lease of 
water fo1· use outside of the municipality \vith a popula-
tion of 1nore than 200,000 shall not give the lessee any 
vested right which will prevent the termination of the 
lease by the municipality. This Court 1nay take ju-
dicial notice of the fact that the city and county of D·en-
ver had a population of more than 200,000 in 1951, \Vhen 
the opinion in the City of Englewood case supra \vas 
rendered. There are no statutory provisions in lTtah 
compHra.ble with th'ose quoted and relied upon by the 
Supreme Court of Colorado in the Engle\vood case. 
Thus the laws of Colorado expressly authorized the 
cities and towns of Colorado to not only sell but to 
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"collect therefor such charges and upon such conditions 
and limitations as said towns and cities may impose by 
ordinance" and the Commission was given jurisdiction 
to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions 
of the state where such duty and power wa:s not speci-
fically vested in ·some other officer or tribunal. 
In the Court below, counsel for the defendant City 
referred to the provisions of Article 11, Sec. 6 wherein 
it is provided that "no municipal corporation shall di-
rectly or indirectly lease, sell, alien or dispose of any 
vvater works, water rights, or sources of water supply 
now or hereafter to be owned or controlled by it, but 
all such water works, water rights and sources of water 
supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired by a mu-
nicipal corporation shall be preserved, maintained and 
operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water 
at reasonable charges. Provided that nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to prevent any such munic-
pal corporation from exchanging water rights, or 
sources of \vater supply, for other water rights or sources 
of water supply of equal value, and to be devote1d in like 
1nanner to the public supply of its inhabitants." 
If the foregoing constitutional provision 1s ad-
hered to literally, the defendant City is without au-
thority to sell or lease any of its water or water right 
for use beyond its boundaries and that provision of 
U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-14 which authorizes cities to sell and 
deliver the surplus product or service of any such 
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works not required by the city or its inhabitants to 
others beyond the limits of the city is in conflict with 
the constitution and therefore void. It will be seen 
that the constitutional provision just quoted provides 
that the water "shall be preserved, maintained and op-
. erated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at 
reasonable prices." Nowhere by the state constitution 
is any authority granted a municipality to sell or dis-
pose of its water to anyone other than the inhabitants 
of the city, quite the contrary as will be seen from the 
language just quoted. We entertain grave doubts that 
the courts will give such constitutional provision such 
construction, but if full effect is given to the language it 
follows that the water belonging to the city must he used 
to supply the inhabitants with water and for no other 
purpose, that is to say, the constitution having sp·ecified 
the p·urpose for which the water must be used, it thereby 
excludes all other uses. 
Be tha.t as it may, it surely would be an un'var-
ranted construction of the constitutional provision here-
tofore quoted to say that notwithstanding the consti-
tution provides that the water owned by the city must 
he preserved, maintained and operated by it for supply-
ing its inhabitants with water, it is also a n1unicipal 
function for the city to construct and operate a w·ater 
system outside of th·e city for non-residents. There is 
another provision of our law dealing with Public lTtili-
ties that is so unlike the Colorado law involved in the 
City of Engle.wood case, supra that makes the conclu-
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sion reached in that case inapplicable to the instant case. 
It will be recalled that the Colorado law heretofore 
quoted expressly grants to cities the right to supply 
and collect such charges for water under such condi-
tions and limitations as the towns and cities may impose. 
So also the ·Colorado Commission is expressly granted 
permission to enforce only such provisions of the con-
stitution and law as are not specifically vested in some 
other officer or tribunal. 
Under our state law creating the Public Utilities 
Commission it is p·rovided in 54-2-1 that: 
"The term corporation includes a corpora-
tion, a municipal corporation and an association 
and a joint stock company having any powers 
or privileges not possessed by individuals or 
partnerships. ~1unicipal corporations includes all 
cities, counties or towns or other governmental 
units created or organized under any general or 
special law of this state." 
In the case of Logan City v. Public Utiliti.es CoJJz-
mission, 72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961, an attempt was n1ade 
by the writer of the main opinion that notwithstanding 
the language just quoted, the Legislature did not intend 
to give the Public Utilities Commission any jurisdiction 
over any of the facilities or products of Inunicipalties. 
The majorty of the Court, however, refused to go along 
with the main opinion in that particular, but on the con-
trary two members of the Court held that the statutory 
provision above quoted included municipal corporation:-:;. 
·One of the justices dissented. 
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Moreover, the argument made in the main opinion 
is founded on language used in other provisions of our 
statutory law which it was argued are inc-onsistent with 
a construction of the law that would give to the Com-
mission jurisdiction over electrical energy that was used 
for the purpose of furnishing electric energy to the city 
and its inhabitants.- No such language is found in our 
statutory law with respect to water owned by the city. 
There is the p·rovision of the constitution above quoted 
which, if followed literally, would preclude the city from 
devoting the \Yater owned by the city for any purpose 
other than to supply the inhabitants of the city with water 
at reasonable charges. The· fact that the defendant Com-
mission is without jurisdiction to regulate the water 
owned by the defendant City and used by it for the pur-
pose of supplying the city and its inhabitants with water 
does not preclude the defendant Commission from regu-
lating the water that the city may sell beyond its lin1its. 
It was argued by counsel for the defendant City, in 
the Court below, that because the defendant City could 
dispose of only its surplus water that therefore the de-
fendant Commission cannot control the actions of the 
city because the city is not a public utility in that it does 
not and cannot hold itself out to serve all "\Vho might ap-
ply for water. The fact that th·e defendant City n1ay 
sell only its surplus \Vater n1akes against the contention 
that it should not and is not subject to the jurisdiction 
of the defendant Co1nmission. The purpose of the Pub-
lic Utility Act is to protect the public. If the ,Yater 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
supply of the city is likely to be discontinued as to non-
residents, it is of vital concern to such non-residents that 
some provision is made for such non-residents to be 
supplied with water if and when the defendant City 
ceases to take care of their needs. It is the duty of the 
defendant Conunission to provide for the protection of 
such non-residents as to their water supply. If the de-
fendant Commission is without jurisdiction of the water 
sold to non-residents, then and in such case it is power-
less to protect the non-resident citizen who is a customer 
of a vvater system operated by the defendant City. A 
number of the cases heretofore cited in this brief point 
out the evils that will flow from depriving the Utilities 
Commission from jurisdiction over water that may be 
sold by a municipality outside of its boundaries. The 
Circuit Court of Oregon in the case heretofore cited goes 
so far as to hold that such a law is unconstitutional. 
.J1any of the cases heretofore cited hold that a city when 
selling water outside of its boundaries is subject to the 
same law that is applicable to a private person or cor-
poration engaged in the same business. There is no 
good reason why a city should be given any special priv-
ileges when it departs from its municipal functions of 
governing the inhabitants. 
Article 6, Section 26 provides : 
''The Legislature is prohibited from enacting 
any private or special law in the follovving cases: 
16. Granting to an individual, association or 
corporation any privilege, inununity or franchise. 
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17. In all cases where a general law can be 
applicable, no special law shall be enacted." 
In connection with the law involved in this action, 
it should be noted that the police or governmental power 
of the defendant City is not involved. Our courts and 
the courts generally, as will be se·en from the cases here-
to£ ore cited, are engaged in the exercise of their proprie-
tary functions when operating a water system. Among 
the Utah cases so holding are: Brown v. Salt Lake City, 
33 U. 222, 93 Pac. 570; Egelhoff v. Ogden City, 71 U. 511, 
267 Pac. 1011. 
U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, which plaintiffs seek to have con-
strued, provides that: '~the term 'public utility' includes 
every water corporation \v·hich performs a service for or 
delivers a commodity to the public for which any compen-
sation or payment whatsoever is received, such \Vater 
corporation is hereby declared to be a public utility, sub-
ject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the connnission 
and to the provisions of this title ..... Any corporation 
or person not engaged in the business exclusively as a 
public utility as hereinbefore defined shall be governed 
by the provisions of this Act in respect only to the pub-
lic utilities or p·ublic utility owned, controlled, operated 
or managed hy it or by him, and not in respect to any 
other business or pursuit." 
When th·e provision just quoted is construed in con-
nection with the definiton that the· term corporation shall 
include a municipal as defined in Sec. 54-2-1 there ''yould 
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seem to be no escape from the conclusion that the de-
fendant City is subject to the jurisdiction of the defend-
ant Commission as to water disposed of outside of the 
city. 
If there is any doubt about the meaning of the lan-
guage just quoted, the remainder of the statutory law 
which plaintiffs seek to have construed would seem t.Q 
remove such uncertainty "\vhere it is provided that "when 
any person, association or company or corporation, 
not engaged in business as a public utility as defined 
by this act shall be able to produce a surplus of ... water 
beyond the needs of its own business and shall desire to 
sell, exchange, 'deliver or otherwise di'spose of such sur-
plus to or with any public utility, then the ·Contract with 
the public utility shall be subject to the ap·proval or dis-
approval of the defendant Commi~ssion." The act then 
proceeds to provide that "Such person, company, corpo-
ration or association selling or exchanging such surplus 
product under such authorized contract ·shall not thereby 
become a public utility within the meaning of this act, nor 
shall it be subject to the jurisdiction of the. ·Commis,sion." 
Thus if effect is given to the language just referred to 
and quoted, the defendant City is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the defen'dant Commission if and when it choo:ses. 
to dispose of its surplus water, especially by operating a 
di'stributing system outside of its boun1daries. If, how-
ever, the surplus water is sold to a public utility then an1d 
in such case the defen:dant City is not subject to the 
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juris-diction of the defendant Commission. To given any 
other construction to the act would be at w.ar with the 
expresseld language of the act. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE DEFENDANT PUBLIC SERVICE ·COM-
MISSION OF UTAH HAS AUTHORITY AND THAT IT 
IS ITS DUTY TO REGULATE THE SALE AND DIS-
TRIBUTION OF WATER WHICH IS DISPOSED OF 
BY THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY OUTSIDE 
OF ITS CORPORATE LIMITS. 
The defendant Comn1ission by its Motion sought to 
have the proceeding dismissed as to it upon two grounds: 
First: The Con1plaint fails to state a claim against de-
fendant up·on which relief can be granted. 
Second: The plaintiffs have not exhausted their ad-
ministrative remedy and thus this action is premature 
as to the defendant. 
As to the first ground, n1uch of what has been said 
about the other defendants \Yho sought and were granted 
a dismissal applies to the Com1nission's first ground. It 
vvill be noted that the Declaratory Judgment Act pro-
vides that resort may be had to the Act to ter1ninate a 
controversy or renzove an uncertainty. U.C.A., 1953, 78-
33-5. That there is a controversy is Inade apparent by 
the· fact that plaintiffs sought the relief prayed for in 
their petition and the defendant ·sought to have the action 
dis1nissed because as set out in its first grounds for dis-
missal, no rc·lief n1ay be granted. Plaintiffs contend not 
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only that relief may be granted, but that the relief prayed 
for should be granted. Thus there is a very substantial 
controversy that the Court must resolve one way or the 
other, that is to say, the Court is required to determine 
the facts as directed by U.C.A. 1953, 78-33-9 and then 
apply the law as directed by U.C.A. 1953, 78-33-1 and 78-
33-2 and having done so, enter the appropriate judgment. 
As heretofore indicated a mere dismissal of the petition 
leaves everything connected with the controversy and un-
certainty undecided . 
.J._.\.s to the second ground of the Commission's Motion 
to Disn1iss, it will be seen that plaintiffs are here seek-
ing a deter1nination of vvhether or not the Commission has 
jurisdiction over the defendant City with respect to water 
sold and delivered outside of its corporate limits. It 
vvould be a hazardous undertaking for plaintiffs to seek 
the relief which they are· here seeking before the defend-
ant Commission. It will be seen that the Declaratory 
Judgment Act vests the district courts, within their re-
spective jurisdictions, with power to grant relief under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act. No such power is vested. 
in the defendant Commission, and even if it were, such 
fact would not preclude the plaintiffs from availing them-
selves of the remedy provided for in the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. Gray v. Defa., supra. 
Moreover, it may well result in the waste of consider-
able time and expense to seek the views of the defendant 
Commission as to whether or not it has jurisdiction over 
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the defendant City's operations outside of its limits. If 
the Commission should assume jurisdiction, and upon a 
review of such decision it was found that it was without 
jurisdiction, the time and expense of presenting the facts 
which may be deemed material would be lost motion, 
whereas hy proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act, the law can be settled and such proceedings may 
then be had as is in conformity with the law so deter-
mined. That is one of the results which the declaratory 
judgment act is calculated to accomplish. Plaintiffs claim 
that defendant Con1mission has jurisdiction over the 
waters the defendant City sells outside of its limits. By 
the action of the trial Court we are at a loss to kno'v upon 
which of the grounds urged by the Con1mission were by 
the Court deemed fatal to plaintiff's petition. 
To summarize plaintiffs contend: 
1. That this action brought by plaintiffs under the 
declaratory judgment act is in the nature of an action 
to quiet title and as such is not subject to dismissal, 
but if any defendant claims no interest in the subject 
matter of this action, such party may be released from 
costs and further appearance in the action by filing a dis-
claimer. 
2. That the defendant, 1\fetropolitan ,, ... ater District 
of Salt Lake City is so tied in with the defendant City 
that it, as a matter of law, has an interest in the subject 
matter of this action. If it desires to he relieved of any 
liability for costs or other further p·articipation in this 
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action, its remedy· is by a disclaimer and not by a dis-
missal of the action, because the plaintiffs are entitled 
to a judgment or decree that will be binding on the Metro-
politan 'Vater district which plaintiffs would probably 
not have if the action were dismissed as to it or as to 
any defendant against whom the action is dismissed. 
3. That the plaintiffs are entitled to affirmative re-
lief' against the defendant Commission decreeing that it 
has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this contro-
versy and requiring said defendant to assume jurisdic-
tion thereof. ~rhat the p]aintiffs are entitled to avail 
themselves of the declaratory judgment act and to do so 
they must proceed in the district court, and therefore the 
law applicable to the necessity of first seeking adminis-
trative relief has no application to this proceeding. 
4. That the defendant Commission has jurisdiction 
over the surplus water of the defendant City which is sold 
outside of its boundaries because the provisions of the 
la\v here sought to have construed so provides, and the 
adjudicated cases fro1n this and other jurisdictions lend 
support to such contention. 
5. That plaintiffs are entitled to have set at rest 
the construction of the statutory laws here brought in 
cruestion so that they may govern themselves accordingly, 
and a dis1nj ssal of the action will not accomplish that re-
sult. 
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We submit that the judgment of dismissal should be 
reversed and the defendant Commission be directed to 
assume jurisdiction of the surplus water which Salt Lake 
City seeks to dispose of outside of its limits and that such 
Commission control and regulate the sale and distribution 
of such waters in the sarne manner as waters of other 
"water corporations." 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALTON ~IEL VILLE 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
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